World Energy Crises and Climate Change

Crises after crises have buffeted oil markets and the U.S. economy in the past several years – wars, hostile world leaders, instable governance, natural disasters, and other factors. These problems have combined to create larger fluctuations in world oil and gasoline prices than society has seen in many years. Oil prices, nearing $80 per barrel, are at historical highs and there is little relief in site. Although markets do adjust to new realities, that adjustment may have important consequences for economic activity. One important difficulty arising from the recent turmoil in the oil markets is that planning for long term is difficult.

Two longer term trends, peak oil and climate change, are potentially more important energy issues that add to the importance of planning. Ohio, in particular, with a strong industrial base, as a center for distribution networks, with growing suburbs, a large and expanding private transportation network, its large coal reserves, and its nearly 19 million acres of farm and forestland, must develop coherent policy to address the implications of these trends.

The articles in this issue of the Ohio Environment Report illustrate the importance of longer term energy issues. The first article, by Seppo Korpela, a Professor of Mechanical Engineering at Ohio State University, considers the issue of "peak oil," the notion that after a long run, oil production will start to decline in the near future. The article illustrates how this important change will have widespread consequences for economies, and it motivates the rationale for broader thinking about transportation and energy policy. The second article considers climate change, arguing that while there is uncertainty about the climate change hypothesis and the costs of large reductions in damages are likely greater than the benefits, the world – including the United States – is engaging in policy. Ohio has taken a back seat in policy-making so far, but it needs to take a more prominent role in order to handle the long-term dilemmas created by peak oil and potential climate change.

To discuss policy frameworks for Ohio, Ohio State University will host a conference on September 26^th and 27^th, 2006 entitled "Ohio Responses to Federal Environmental Regulation." The sessions on September 26^th will consider water and air quality. The sessions on September 27^th will address climate and energy policy. For complete information on the conference, including registration information, please visit:

The Developing World Oil Crisis
Seppo A. Korpela, Professor of Mechanical Engineering, The Ohio State University (korpela.1@osu.edu)

The reasons given in the press for today’s persistent high oil price are many, but most relate to proximate causes. Limited refining capacity, war premium, periodic instability in Nigeria, and nationalistic policies of Venezuela and Russia are all true, but their effects can only be felt strongly in a world in which spare production capacity has all but vanished. The only country with any extra capacity is Saudi Arabia, and it is for heavy and sour crude. Only the few refineries specially designed to accept this grade of crude can turn it into finished products.[1]

The lack of spare capacity has been attributed to lack of investment in the oil producing countries, for outside OPEC, many oil industry insiders echo the words of the chief operating officer, Paulo Scaroni, of the Italian oil company ENI, who has said that “the search for new reserves has become a nightmare”.[2] As the prospects for new fields diminish, demand keeps rising in the populous countries, such as China and India. It is also in the upswing in the oil producing countries themselves, which in turn diminishes the amount of exportable oil.

Since oil is a non-renewable resource, it will eventually run out, but many resource economists assure us that this day is far away and substitutes will be found as prices rise to replace oil as the most important source of energy to fuel modern industrial economies. How the substitution will take place is problematic, for oil constitutes 38 percent of world’s primary energy production. The contributions of natural gas and coal are both 24 percent. Most of the remaining 14 percent comes from hydropower and nuclear energy, with other renewables amounting to mere one percent.[3] Biomass is generally not counted in these statistics for the reason that it is used locally, and the amounts are difficult to measure. Were it to be included, it together with wind, solar and geothermal energy, would amount to 3 percent of the total.[4]

The world’s oil production is today about 72 million barrels a day or, if all petroleum liquids are counted, the daily consumption rises to 84 million barrels[5]. This means that every 12 days a billion barrels of liquid petroleum is consumed. The yearly discovery rate is decreasing, with only 5 billion barrels of oil discovered in 2005[6]. World oil discovery reached its all time peak in 1964 and since 1983 more oil has been used yearly than has been discovered. It is worth while to contrast these numbers with those for the United States, where peak oil discovery took place in 1931 and peak production in 1970[7]. This forty year time lag between the discovery trend and production suggests that world has, or is approaching, its peak production.

About one half of world’s oil extraction comes from 120 super-giant fields, and all of them are over thirty five years old[8]. The youngest, Mexico’s Cantarell field is still the second best producing field in the world yielding over two million barrels a day, but a recent press release by Mexico’s national oil company Pemex shows that this field has begun its terminal decline[9]. The same is true for the third best producing field in the world, Kuwait’s Burgan field, in which the production has dropped to 1.7 million barrels a day from 1.9 million last year[10].

The original endowment of oil on our planet earth has been estimated to have been between 2000 and 3000 billion barrels, most studies tending toward the middle of this range. The cumulative production has now past the 1000 billion barrel mark. Since oil production will follow roughly a bell shaped curve, after the midpoint the world will need to get by with decreasing quantities of oil. Independent analysts put the date of peak oil production somewhere between now and 2012. My own calculations show it to be in late 2008 and the yearly production rates are shown in the figure below, which is an updated version from a previous article[11].

Figure 1: World oil production. The curve until 1990 is drawn to approximate actual data, which is also shown. From 1993 on, the curve is based on a model using a logistic equation.

The United States Department of Energy and the International Energy Agency, on the other hand, do not foresee a downturn before 2030. They are most likely wrong about this, as they have been with their price projections, for they still today project oil prices not to exceed $50 dollars in 2030[12]. This may happen if the world economies sink into a deep recession, but this cannot be the reason for their projections. Traditionally resource economists have based their calculations for the rise in oil price on the prevailing interest rate and they have not included any scarcity premium into their price projections.

These statistics show that world is utterly dependent on fossil fuels and it is difficult to see how an orderly transition to alternatives can be made. In fact, there are no alternatives in sight for replacing the petroleum which nature now reluctantly yields to human use. The transition to lower oil use will be taxing in the industrial world, for it is difficult to see how to power the automobile fleet of over 800 million cars in the world and 220 million in the United States[13].

The transportation sector consumes 68 percent of the oil in the United States, and this sector is 97 percent dependent on petroleum.[14] Hence the developing crisis in oil production will do the greatest damage to our suburban way of life, for we in the United States have been reluctant to take preventive action on the consequences of continuing urban and exurban sprawl. Public transportation is the Untied States is underdeveloped and the hundred-year building binge of suburban growth still goes unabated.

The situation will likely evolve by first consumers buying smaller automobiles as the gasoline prices increase. At the same time, as is already apparent, more hybrid models will enter the markets. After this diesel powered and diesel hybrid cars will increase the fuel mileage still further.

At some point the CAFÉ standards for automobile fleet mileage requirements will undoubtedly be tightened. Also ethanol is entering the markets as alternative transportation fuel, as will bio-diesel. Finally, and most importantly, there is likely to be a renaissance in passenger rail transportation, both in cities and in intra-state rail.

There is, of course, no guarantee that the transition to more effective transportation will be smooth, and without actual shortages of motor fuels. The gap which is developing between demand and supply can grow quite rapidly. The current demand growth has been about 1.7% a year and oil fields, if nothing is done to them, deplete at 5-6% rate. With infill drilling and new discoveries this has so far been held in check, but depletion rates are likely to reach a 5% yearly rate 20 years after the peak in oil production. Since supply and demand has to balance in the end, rapid move to rail in the United States would be the best way to alleviate the strain on supply.

When the world oil production begins its decline, it will be the first time humanity must move to inferior fuels. It was only in 1885 when coal first exceeded biomass as the main fuel source in the United States. Gasoline and diesel fuels have high energy density and they are easy to transport, as they exist in liquid form at atmospheric pressure and temperature. They have also proven to be quite safe and easy to handle. It is for these reasons that they are difficult to replace.

The Climate Change Era
Brent Sohngen, AED Economics, Ohio State University (Sohngen.1@osu.edu)

The age of climate change is upon us. TV and radio news talk about it. Newspapers print articles. Comedians make fun of it. Politicians take fact finding trips and promote legislation. Many countries worldwide have signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol. State governments in the U.S. have gotten into the act and have adopted policies aimed at reducing carbon emissions. The President describes what this administration is doing to combat it. The former Vice-President makes a movie.

What's all this buzz about? A single article cannot hope to describe every detail of the complicated science and policy issue that is "climate change." But what I do hope to do in this article is to examine several important issues that have been lost in the hype of recent months. Briefly, these issues are (1) How important is uncertainty in the science? (2) What do we know about the potential economic effects of climate change? (3) What do we know about the potential costs of avoiding climate change? (4) What can Ohio do?

The science of climate change is pretty strong and convincing, and it has been getting stronger over time, not weaker. The basic issue is that greenhouse gases, like carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides, methane, and ozone depleting substances (refrigerants, of all things), trap heat in the atmosphere. Emissions of these gases are tied to industrial processes, transportation, deforestation, and other economic activities. As economic activity grows, emissions grow. Based on projections of population and world-wide economic growth over this century, the increases in emission caused by that growth may cause global average temperatures to rise by 2 – 10° F by 2100.

This large band of potential average temperature change is driven by uncertainties in estimates of economic growth and technology change, and scientific understanding about atmospheric processes. Economic and population growth, when considered over a century, are very uncertain. Unfortunately, this uncertainty can never be resolved in advance. However, this is one instance where economists tend to be optimistic in that they project that economic activity likely will continue to grow at 1 – 3% per year worldwide over this century. Technology is also uncertain – that is, we don't know if some new technologies will suddenly become economical to use and "save the day." Historically, technological advances have caused carbon dioxide emissions per $ of gross domestic product in the U.S. to decline at around 14% per decade (Clarke et al., 2006). Most economists believe that these gains will continue, although they often assume slower rates of change in the future.

Even if we knew for certain how fast the economy would grow, and what would happen to technology change (i.e., if we knew for certain carbon dioxide emissions for the entire century), we'd still be uncertain about how much temperature would change, what would happen to precipitation, and how the changes would play out in different regions of the world. For instance, scientists still don't know what the effects of increasing carbon dioxide concentrations to 700 parts per million in the atmosphere will actually do to the atmosphere and consequently to global average temperature. Historical data based on ice-cores and other information do provide evidence that the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (in particular carbon) is closely associated with global temperature in the long-term (thousands of years) record. But the underlying causal relationships are still debated, and this uncertainty results in the relatively large range of potential warming over this century reported by scientists.

There are two modes of thought in the face of this uncertainty. One mode is to sit back and do nothing until we are relatively certain about the effects. Another mode, promoted by Yohe et al. (2004), suggests that we need to take out some climate insurance and begin acting now. Either way, the same questions must then be answered: What risks do we face by inaction (or what benefits do we get by acting) and what are the costs?

The effects of climate change may be fairly dramatic in some places, but on average they are not estimated to be as large as some would like to believe. Any sectors of the economy that rely on climate could be affected – including agriculture, forestry, water supply, and heating and cooling, etc. Let's consider agriculture more closely because it is the sector that has been the most widely studied. Carbon dioxide is an input into much of the world's agriculture (that is agricultural plants convert carbon dioxide through photosynthesis into marketable products), so an increase in "free" carbon dioxide should contribute to an increase in yield. Further, if the climate is warmer and there is more precipitation, the combination of increased carbon dioxide and an improved climate will contribute to an increase in agricultural yields. However, if it gets warmer and there is less precipitation, or if the precipitation occurs at the wrong time, agricultural yields could fall. Recent estimates in the U.S. indicate that climate change is likely to increase crop yields and enhance welfare in the U.S. by $1.0 - $8.0 billion per year, or by up to $26 per person per year (Reilly et al., 2002).

Beyond agriculture, most studies indicate that climate change will have relatively small effects on the global economy, at least as long as the change in climate occurs smoothly. Tol (2002), for instance, estimates that a 1.8° F increase in global temperatures would actually increase economic output globally by around 2%. Thus, at the lower end of the range of 2 – 10° F described above, society may well benefit from climate change. If temperatures rise above these low levels, economic estimates suggest that many regions in the world would experience larger economic damages. The larger changes in temperature, however, are expected to occur further into the future, so these negative effects also occur farther into the future. Why aren't the effects larger? People can adapt to climate change in many ways, for example by altering their crops (jobs), by shifting goods from one region to another, or other methods.

Despite the potential for global aggregate benefits, there could be substantial negative impacts in the near-term for specific regions or countries. Sea level rise could imperil people who inhabit islands, for example. Certain ecosystems already at the edge (such as those atop mountains or coral reefs) could disappear. Weather patterns could change in unexpected ways causing increased storm damage.

What do these economic estimates really tell us? Mainly they suggest that there are sound reasons to address climate change – a 10° F change this century would cause damages – but economic systems are not likely to be imperiled by climate change. Some sectors will be damaged, some sectors will gain. On net, small increases in temperature are likely to benefit the global economy, large increases becoming increasingly harmful. To address this, society needs to begin building institutions that (1) help locations negatively affected by climate change adapt and (2) promote the development of incentives and technologies that will reduce carbon emissions.

The policy of climate change now is more important than the science. The economic implications of slowing climate change are dramatic. They define the policy question in front of us. A study from the U.S. Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) has used three widely recognized models to analyze what society would have to do to reduce the impacts of climate change (Clarke et al., 2006). The basic result from this study is that the challenge in front of us is tremendous.

Current atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide are about 375 parts per million. Estimates from the three models in the CCSP exercise indicate that if no controls are undertaken, carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere will rise to 715 to 875 parts per million by 2100. These results are based on the assumption that population increases to 8 – 10 billion people (from approximately 6.5 billion today), global gross domestic product increases by 2.1 to 2.4 % per year on average, and that the rate of emission per $ of gross domestic product declines 5- 15% per decade. With these assumptions, per capita carbon dioxide emissions are projected to increase globally from about 4.4 tonnes carbon dioxide per person to 9.4 tonnes carbon dioxide per person. Current U.S. emissions are around 21.6 tonnes carbon dioxide per person.

When policy makers consider what we can do to avoid climate change, they ask "what will it take to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at levels below the 875 parts per million projected by models for 2100?" Remember, these higher levels are anticipated to cause 2 - 10°F increase in temperature. The study by Clarke et al. (2006) examined four "stabilization" policies, which would limit the growth in greenhouse gas concentrations to 450, 550, 650, and 750 parts per million. Stabilizing at 750 parts per million implies relatively modest effort over the century. Stabilizing at 450 parts per million implies that we would have to start undertaking activities almost immediately, and we would have to make deep cuts in our emissions. Stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at 450 parts per million would still cause some climate change, but the change would be well below the dangerous levels that concern most scientists.

The three models examined in Clarke et al. (2006) indicate that the lighter constraint of stabilizing concentrations at 750 parts per million would cost less than a 0.1% reduction in world gross domestic product by 2020, or less than about $60 billion per year for the entire world. That's a reduction in income of about $8 per person per year for everyone in the world. Under the more extensive policy of meeting a stabilization target of 450 parts per million, world gross domestic product could be reduced by up to 2.1% by 2020, or around $1300 billion ($1.3 trillion) per year for the entire world. That's a heavier tax of about $163 per person per year. For this more stringent target, carbon taxes would amount to around $0.67 per gallon of gasoline in 2020.

Should society, and the U.S. in particular, do little or nothing and plan to adapt, or should society undertake substantial efforts to avoid future changes? Even if society undertakes large efforts today to reduce emissions, some sectors and regions of the world will need to learn to adapt to cope with changes that result from historical emissions anyways (see Arvai et al., 2006).

Most other developed nations have already signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol, which is the 1997 treaty that binds countries to specific emissions targets in the years 2008 – 2012. These countries have agreed that gentle persuasion is not enough, and that hard targets on emissions must be enforced in order to reduce emissions. A hard target, or cap, is a nationally set limit on the amount of emissions allowed each year. No one debates whether the Kyoto Protocol will solve the climate problem. It will not because too many countries have no hard targets, it is binding for only one period (2008 – 2012), and the cuts are too small. But it may well turn out to be a good first step towards setting up a framework for future treaties that further limit emissions.

The U.S. has been vilified globally for not entering the Kyoto Protocol, but this does not mean that the U.S. has not undertaken climate policy. Rather than setting limits on greenhouse gas emissions, the U.S. has instead set energy efficiency targets for the economy as a whole, and it has focused research and development on technology solutions to climate change (i.e., research on mitigation technologies, and alternative fuels). This research and development includes research into bio-energy, carbon capture and storage (removing carbon from the emissions of coal burning power plants and storing the carbon in wells under the earth's surface), nuclear power, and other renewable energy sources. Coincidentally, energy prices have risen in recent years, spurring additional emphasis on technology solutions to the climate change problem.

The results in Clarke et al. (2006) show that stabilizing carbon concentrations in the atmosphere is not a one legged stool. It will require many different actions, including reductions in overall fossil fuel consumption, new technologies, bio-fuels, nuclear energy, and carbon sequestration in forests and agriculture.

What policies are best suited to meeting this challenge? Both of the policies above (hard targets and technology push) can potentially achieve the technology component of the mandate. For example, hard targets can spur companies to invent new technologies, and they can give rise to entire new industries that invent and deploy new technologies. Hard targets also allow policy makers to provide incentives to reduce consumption of specific types of fuels and to shift towards cleaner fuels. However, hard targets have one important negative: If the targets are too strict, costs can rise rapidly, leading to unforeseen economic consequences. This is one of the concerns the U.S. government in the early 2000s had with the Kyoto Protocol – the targets were potentially too strict and there were not enough safety valves that allowed lower cost options.

Although the U.S. as a whole has resisted hard caps on emissions, some states and regions have hinted that they are interested in using caps locally. The Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, for instance, is a group of northeastern states that are developing greenhouse gas policy together, including the consideration of a cap on greenhouse gas emissions. The state of California is also working towards a cap on carbon emissions. Senators McCain and Lieberman have several time sponsored legislation to set a national cap on carbon dioxide emissions, although the bill has never gained enough support to move through Congress. Caps on emissions have worked in other sectors, but there is not yet enough public and industry support for them to be instituted nationally.

Pushing technology can be an attractive alternative. It requires that the government and industry agree to place resources into viable technological development, and that both find funds to pay for it. Incentives to reduce consumption of dirtier fuels occur as new technologies are deployed and prices fall. However, it puts lots of emphasis on finding funding mechanisms, and more importantly, on making good choices today about viable research and development strategies that will have pay-offs many years in the future.

Ohio accounts for around 4.5% of the total emissions of greenhouse gases in the United States, emitting around 84 million tonnes carbon (Waltzer, 2005). Although most of the land in the state is used for agriculture and forests, Ohio is a heavily industrialized state. The state gets 88% of its energy from coal, which is the state's primary contributor to greenhouse gas emissions (U.S. Energy Information Administration). Climate policies that focus on setting hard targets for greenhouse gas emissions would have large implications for Ohio's electricity producers. Climate policies that focus on pushing new technologies also have large implications for Ohio's electricity producers.

Other sectors would also be affected by policies that set targets for emissions. Around 25% of our emission is attributable to the transportation sector, 7% to residential heating, and 4% to the agricultural sector (Waltzer, 2005). The agricultural and other land using sectors (e.g. forestry), however, could also benefit from hard targets because land using sectors can remove carbon from the atmosphere by increasing conservation tillage or by increasing the area of forests. Everyone in the state would be affected by policies that set strict targets to curb greenhouse gas emissions.

The climate challenge is exceedingly complex in Ohio because it is heavily reliant on coal for energy. It is not surprising that energy companies in the state, like American Electric Power, are among the first power companies in the country to vow to test out new clean-coal technologies at a commercially viable scale. This new generation of power plants proposes to utilize coal for generation, but to reduce carbon emissions to nearly 0 by storing the emissions in wells. The development, and commercial implementation of such technologies, represents the potential for technology push strategies to have an impact on the climate change challenge.

The efforts by private companies like American Electric Power are an important development, but they are only one piece of the technology puzzle. They are not a complete strategy. Ohio needs a more comprehensive plan for greenhouse gases – one that moves the state towards a broader view about what creates a better environment and a more productive economy. The report by Waltzer (2005) provides a number of very specific ideas on what Ohio can do. Some more general elements of a policy that Ohio needs to start developing are:

(1) A clear assessment of energy technology options available in Ohio, including hard-nosed economic analysis: If the state decides to invest more in companies, universities, and other groups who are inventing and trying new technologies, or if the state plans to provide tax incentives for the adoption of certain types of technology, the state needs to have an unbiased economic assessment of the options.

(2) Inclusion of climate change considerations in the development of state-wide transportation policy: It's not clear whether hybrid, electric, or fuel cell cars will win the day in the future, or whether public transportation will be the way to go. However, by investing heavily in road infrastructure, Ohio has already made choices here. I'd feel better about these choices if I knew that potential future climate and energy policy were considered when transportation policy is debated.

(3) Continue to push for competitive electricity and natural gas pricing, including fair net metering rules: Over the long-haul, competitively set prices are still the strongest incentive companies face in most industries. If the U.S. actually adopts some sort of national climate policy, relative prices for energy will change, and these changes in prices will provide strong incentives for companies to adopt new technologies. Companies can only respond to them if the prices they face are competitively set.

(4) Create a carbon inventory registry: The federal government, through the Department of Energy, has already established a voluntary program for reporting on greenhouse gases (the 1605(b) program - http://www.pi.energy.gov/enhancingGHGregistry/). Ohio should use this information and encourage large and small companies in the state to develop greenhouse gas inventories. They should also encourage landowners to undertake greenhouse gas inventories on their land. In the case of future federal programs that include a cap on emissions, this information will give companies and landowners a leg-up. In addition, the state should conduct a careful inventory of carbon and carbon emissions in its operations, including its public land management policies.

(5) Analyze and adjust the tax code: I realize that we have recently made large adjustments in the tax code in the state, but I think a continued evaluation of the business and individual tax code in the state with an eye towards climate and energy policy would reveal more opportunities to enhance the long-term viability of economic activity in the state.

Arvai, Joseph, G. Bridge, N. Dolsak, R. Franzese, T, Koontz, A. Luginbuhl, P. Robbins, K. Richards, K. Smith Korfmacher, B. Sohngen, J. Tansey, A. Thompson. 2006. "Adaptive management of the global climate problem: Bridging the gap between climate research and climate policy." Forthcoming: Climatic Change.

Clarke, L., J. Edmonds, H. Jacoby, H. Pitcher, J. Reilly, R. Richels. 2006. "CCSP Synthesis and Assessment Product 2.1, Part A: Scenarios of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Atmospheric Concentrations." Draft for Public Comment. June 26, 2006. U.S. Climate Change Science Program: http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap2-1/public-review-draft/default.htm.

Reilly, J., F. Tubiello, B. McCarl, D. Abler, R. Darwin, K. Fuglie, S. Hollinger, C. Izaurralde, S. Jagtap, J. Jones, L. Mearns, D. Ojima, E. Paul, K. Paustian, S. Riha, N. Rosenberg, Cynthia Rosenzweig. 2002. Agriculture: The Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tol, R.S.J. 2002. "Estimates of the damage costs of climate change. Part 1: Benchmark estimates" Environmental and Resource Economics. 21(1): 47-73.

Waltzer, K. 2005. "Ohio Climate Road Map: Part 1." Published by the Ohio Environmental Council: www.theoec.org.

Yohe, G., N. Andronova, M. Schlesinger. 2004. "To Hedge or Not Against an Uncertain Climate Future?" Science. 306 (5695): 416 – 417

Energy Information Administration Climate Change web page
http://www.eia.doe.gov/environment.html
(Includes link to 1605b voluntary climate change reporting guidelines)

Footnotes for Korpela Article

[1] “Can OPEC’s Offer Make a Difference?” Stephen Clayson, Sept. 22, 2005, Resource Investor. http://www.resourceinvestor.com/pebble.asp?relid=13059

[2] “Power shifts to nations with big oil reserves”, Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2006

[3] “World Primary Energy Production by Source, 1970-2003. http://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/txt/ptb1101.html

[4] US Energy Flow Trends 2002, June 2004, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, http://eed.llnl.gov/flow

[5] “Global Reserves, Oil Production Show Small Increases for 2005”, Oil and Gas Journal, December 19, 2005,

[6] Association of Peak Oil , Newsletter 64, May 2006, Item No. 695.

[7] “The Coming Oil Crisis”, Colin J. Campbell, Multi-Science Co. Ltd. 1998.

[8] “The World’s Giant Oil Fields”, Matthew Simmons, White Paper, January 9, 2002, Simmons-International, http://www.simmonsco-intl.com/files/giantoilfields.pdf

[9] “ Cantarell poses a legal headache, El Universal, March 31, 2006.

[10] “Kuwait’s biggest field starts to run out of oil”, Peter J. Cooper, Kuwait Times, March 14, 2006.

[11] “Prediction of World Peak Oil Production”, Seppo A. Korpela, in The Final Energy Crisis, ed. Andrew McKillop and Sheila Newman, Pluto Press, London, 2005.

[12] Energy Information Agency of DOE. http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/forecasting.html

[13] Transportation Data Handbook, Ed. 24, Stacy C. Davis and Susan W. Diegel, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 2004.

[14] US Energy Flow Trends 2002.